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Testimony in Virginia on the
Ultimate Fact in Issue
JAMES W. PAYNE, JR.

In a series of recent decisions the Court of Appeals has
rejected opinion evidence for the reason, among others, that
the opinion related to the ultimate fact in issue, or for the
synonymous reason that it invaded the province of the jury.
These decisions relate to opinion testimony offered by lay
witness and expert alike, although an objection to expert
testimony on the ground that it relates to the ultimate fact
in issue is normally weaker in force than the same objection
when it is advanced to rule out lay testimony. When the
expert testifies, by hypothesis, the lay judge or juror is substantially less able to draw an appropriate inference, specialized knowledge based on education or experience being
required. My notation of cases is intended to be illustrative
only-not exhaustive. In Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va.
245, 105 S.D. 2d 155 (1958), a special agent for the National
Board of Fire Underwriters was not permitted to offer an
opinion that a given fire was of incendiary origin, the court
stating that expert opinion was not needed in the case (i.e.,
that the jury could decide from the facts in evidence), and
that the opinion invaded the province of the jury on the ultimate facts in issue.
In Newton v. City of Richmond, 198 Va. 869, 875, 96 S.E.
2d 775, 780 (1957), the testimony of a medical expert to the
effect that a person whose blood he had analyzed was "not
fit to operate an -automobile" was -held improper as an "invasion of the jury's province." Here it is difficult to see that
the expert testimony amounted to more than an opinion on
a mixed question of law and fact, and the court's decision
might well be explained on this basis alone.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 236, 117 S.E. 2d 67
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(1960), a lay witness was not permitted to testify that the
defendant in a criminal prosecution "didn't act like he was
out of his mind" at about the time of the commission of the
crime involved. Here, the court, without elaboration or reference to cases apparently contra, simply stated the general
rule that a witness can -testify to facts only and not to
opinions or conclusions based on those facts. It is certainly a
bit more than conceivable that the court was influenced by
the rather notorious unreliability of lay opinion to the effect
that a given person is or was sane, such unreliability making
the opinion peculiarly misleading. In this connection, too,
it should be borne in mind that Virginia refuses to treat evidence as relevant unless it "tends in an appreciable degree
to prove a material fact." The emphasis should be on the
word "appreciable".
The decision in Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 108 S.E.
2d 380 (1959), gives trouble. Here the plaintiffs, the Stockners,
brought an action for injuries sustained as a result of a collision between their automobile -and -a tractor-traior owned
by defendant Venable and driven by his employee, Laws.
Plaintiffs contended that the tractor-trailer was partially on
the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident and
offered Mr. Snyder as an expert witness on this point. The
court states at pp. 903-905:
The Stockners offered as a witness Ralph H. Snyder of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, who testified that he had had
twenty-five years experience as a 'safety engineer, accident analyst.' He first went to the scene on June 5, 1957,
the day before the trial commenced and a year and a
half after the accident. He examined the marks on the
pavement, the photographs which had been taken of these,
the photographs of the damaged vehicles, and from these
undertook to reconstruct the accident and express an
opinion -as to how it had occurred. He was examined at
length in the absence of the jury and the Stockners
offered to prove by him that from his examination of the
scene and the photographs he was able to determine the
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point of the impact, the angle of the impact, the manner
in which the vehicles had collided, and the fact that at the
moment of the impact the left side of the tractor-trailer
protruded at least a foot and a half across the center line
into the lane of the Stockner car.
In the absence of the jury the trial court ruled that
this witness could express an opinion as to the angle,
but not as to the point, of the impact, or the fact that
at the moment of the impact the tractor was encroaching
upon the lane of the Stockner car. This latter fact, it
ruled, was 'the ultimate fact in the case' to be determined by the jury.

We agree with the contention of Venable and Laws...
that none of the stated testimony of this witness was
admissible. It is well settled that expert evidence concerning matters of common knowledge or those as to
which the jury are as competent to form an accurate
opinion as the witness is inadmissible.

Hence, in the present case the testimony of the witness,
Snyder, invaded the province of the jury... the witness
was invited to express an opinion on the very issue to be
decided by the jury.
Certainly the court does not hold that Mr. Snyder is not
an expert in accident analysis. The record shows that Mr.
Snyder was accepted as a qualified expert without question in
the trial court. Records No. 4906, 4907 at p. 141. The MODEL
CODE OF EViDENCE, rule 402 (1942) states:
A witness is an expert witness and is qualified to give
expert testimony if the judge finds that to perceive, know
or understand the matter concerning which the witness is
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to testify, requires special knowledge, skill, experience
or training and that the witness has the requisite special
knowledge, skill, experience or training.
The Model Code adds that the question of qualification is
within the province of the trial judge and that his decision
will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous as a matter
of law. Ibid. See also: Bratt et al v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,
155 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir., 1946) and cases cited there.
It was argued in the trial court and held in the appellate
court that expert testimony was not needed in this case. Yet
this would seem to be the very kind of case in which expert
testimony is most needed. We have clumps of debris on the
highway, gouge marks, and badly mashed cars. Any jury
might easily be confused or mislead by such a common supposition as that the point of impact is the point where debris
may be concentrated. Aside from this possible point of confusion, any jury might well have difficulty in determining the
angle of impact and the point of impact on the highway from
the evidence noted. If the opinion of a qualified expert would
aid in decision, the writer contends that the opinion Should
come in.
In Dickerson v. Town of Christiansburg,201 Va. 342, 111
S.E. 2d 292 (1959), in a prosecution for driving under the
influence, two police officers testified that defendant was
driving his car from side to side; that when apprehended he
was unsteady on his feet; that he was unable to talk; -and that
a bottle of whiskey was found in his car. ,There was other
evidence that defendant suffered from a physical disability
which might well account for his behavior. It was held that
the trial court erred in permitting the officers to express an
opinion that defendant was intoxicated for the reason that
such an opinion usurped the jury's function on the only fact
in issue. Again, this is a case involving a detailed description
of relatively simple facts by the officers involved so that it
could be said that opinion testimony was unnecesary-i.e.,
that the jury was perfectly capable of drawing an inference
or making a decision on the basis of the facts in evidence.
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Thus, again, the opinion of the Court of Appeals may well
rest on this circumstance.
In Webb. v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 129 S.E. 2d 22
(1963), the defendant was indicted for embezzling her employer's funds. At the trial of the case one Whiteside testified
for the Commonwealth that the "'effect' of the two deposit
slips prepared by the defendant . .. , which contained unrecorded receipts on the books was that.. . 'they had to replace
funds from other customers which had been removed." Id.
at p. 33. The court adds: "The witness's answer went beyond
merely stating what the books showed. It had the effect of
stating a conclusion that the unrecorded receipts were used to
replace funds converted by the defendant to her own use,
which is the very issue in this case." Id. at p. 33. The court
states the following rule in rejecting such testimony: "It is
generally held that while an expert witness may be permitted
to express his opinion relative to the existence or nonexistence
of facts not within common knowledge, he cannot give his
opinion upon the precise or ultimate fact in issue, which must
be left to the jury or the court trying the case without a jury
for determination." Id. at p. 33. Actually, the court's decision
in this case may be based on three facts without resort to the
puzzling formula prohibiting an opinion on the ultimate fact
in issue. First, the court apparently treats the testimony of
the witness as a conclusion regarding the legal issue in the
case. Second, the court suggests that the facts were such that
a jury could draw an inference or form a conclusion as readily
as the witness; and third, the witness's statement was in the
realm of the kind of surmise or conjecture which was not
calculated to be helpful to the jury.
Finally, in the earlier but leading case of Mitchell v. Coinmonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 565, 127 S.E. 368, 376 (1925), a bank
officer was prosecuted for making entries designed to conceal
the true state of his account. The Court of Appeals said that
a witness, expert or not, could not testify that the effect of
these entries would be to conceal the true state of the def endant's account, since such testimony would amount to an
opinion on the very fact to be tried by the jury. Again, the

TESTIMONY ON THE ULTIMATE FACT IN ISSUE

31

court noted, too, that the facts were such that expert opinion
was not needed to enable the jury to form its conclusion.
By way of comment on the cases noted thus far, it is true
that where feasible, or perhaps possible, a witness is required
to give testimony in the form of statements of fact and not
statements of opinion. It is also true-and equally true-that
if the witness observes facts or, in the case of a non-eyewitness expert, assumes them; if he is capable of forming an
opinion based on those facts; and if the facts are such that
they cannot be described adequately to the jury, the witness
will generally be allowed to state his opinion. This rule is a
simple matter of convenience in some cases, and a matter of
necessity in many others if we are to arrive at something
approximating the truth. This rule amounts to a paraphrase
of Virginia's so-called "collective facts doctrine." See, e.g.,
Mohler v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 713, 727, 111 S.E. 454
(1922). It might also be noted that the tendency of our courts
to insist upon facts or more detailed testimony increases as
the testimony of the witness approaches those matters or
facts upon which a case may hinge. McCormick, Evidence,

§ 12 (1954).
It seems unfortunate to me if we have, perhaps, permitted
the opinion rule, and more specifically, the rule prohibiting
opinions on so-called "ultimate" or "dispositive" facts to
harden into a rigid exclusionary rule. In the first place, there
is an enormous logical problem involved in distinguishing between statements of fact and statements of opinion. In United
States v. Petrone, 185 F. 2d 334 (2nd cir., 1950) the court,
composed of Learned Hand, Chief Judge, and Swan and
Frank, states:
In this circuit we have several times taken another
view: that is, that the question is at most one of discretion, turning upon how the judge thinks the truth may
best be extracted from the particular witness who chances
to be on the stand. Made obligatory, not only may the
canon become a substantial obstacle to developing the
truth, but it presupposes a logical solecism: for our per-
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ceptions-even our most immediate sense perceptionsare always 'conclusions'. The question ought always to
be whether it is more convenient to insist that the witness
disentangle in his own mind-which, much more often
than not, he is quite unable to do-those constituent
factors on which his opinion is based; or to let him state
his opinion and leave to cross examination a searching
inquisition to uncover its foundations. Yet such is the
inveterate habit in American courts of treating rules of
evidence as though they were sacred tables, that it is
apparently impossible to substitute the view that they
should be lightly held as wise admonitions for the general
conduct of the trial. See also: McCormick, Evidence
§ 11 (1954). 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1919 (3d. ed. 1940).
In the second place, the rule that opinion evidence on the
ultimate question for the trier of facts is not admissible tends
to confusion and to eliminate much cogent and reliable testimony.
Where an expert is needed, the circumstance that the jury
must decide the ultimate questions of fact is certainly no
reason for depriving them of the benefit of such testimony. If
an expert is on the stand then, by hypothesis, the jury cannot
decide or easily draw many of the inferences from evidential
facts to those material facts that will decide the case. This
decision has been made by the trial judge together with the
decision that the expert is qualified to draw these crucial
inferences. If the opinion evidence will aid the jury, it is
even more important that they have the benefit of the opinion
on ultimate facts, since these decide a case and since a mistake
here means an erroneous result or decision. In applying any
rigid rule excluding opinion evidence on the decisive facts,
we discard evidence that is more cogent than the evidence
which we receive on evidentiary facts-and we do so chiefly
because it is more pertinent or cogent. It has not been held
in Virginia, or generally elsewhere, that direct eyewitness
testimony as to an ultimate or decisive fact is inadmissible
simply because it happens to be offered to prove such a fact,
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but logically, if opinion testimony is rejected solely because
it relates to the ultimate fact in issue, we should ,likewise
reject eyewitness testimony as to such facts. Please remember, now, we are considering the kind of opinion testimony
that would ordinarily be received, but is rejected solely because it relates to ultimate facts.
The rule (if it is a rule) under discussion can be traced
back to a group of early decisions in which courts employed
the phrase: "That is the question which the jury must decide" when the courts were rejecting opinions that would not
tend to aid the jury in understanding their problem or in
arriving at the truth. See Hooper v. General Motors Corp.,
123 Utah 515, 260 P. 2d 549 (1953). (Concurring opinion by
Wade.) This is a familiar rule applicable to all opinion evidence, and it is a viewpoint once espoused by the Virginia
court in discussing the admissibility of an opinion on an ultimate fact in issue. In Virginia By. &6Power Co. v. Burr, 145
Va. 338, 133 S.E. 776 (1926), the court quoted with approval
from Wigmore and applied the following standard:
The second corollary to the general principle of knowledge is that the result of the witness's observation need
not be positive or absolute knowledge. Such a degree of
knowledge cannot be demanded even in theory; it suffices
if he had an opportunity for personal observation, and
did get some impressions from the observation . . . if
there was actual personal observation of the pertinent
fact, (the witness) may testify as to the impression which
he then gained from his personal observation. What the
courts repudiate then is a mere guess, an exercise of
the imagination, a suspicion, a conjecture, offered in the
place of personal observation; it is from this point of
view only that a belief or opinion or impression is not
to be received. Id. at 352, 353.
Other phrases often used to reject opinion testimony on the
ultimate fact in issue are that such testimony "usurps the
function of the jury" or "invades the province of the jury."
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Wigmore states that these phrases are no more than mere
bits of empty rhetoric. 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1920 (3d ed.
1940). He then adds the argument that the witness could
not "usurp" the function of the jury if he desired because the
jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view.
Ibid. No legal power can compel them to accept the witness's
opinion against their own.
I must confess that there is one situation in which I have
considerable sympathy with the objection that the opinion
of a given witness "usurps the function of the jury" or "invades the province of the jury." This is in a case where the
witness expresses an opinion as to the law or an opinion on
a mixed question of law and fact. Thus, a witness could not
offer an opinion directly on such legal questions as damages,
negligence, testamentary capacity, and the like. In these and
similar instances the witness would be assuming an unarticulated legal standard and applying this standard to the facts
observed by him to reach a legal conclusion. It is true, in
our adversary system, that it is peculiarly within the province of the jury to apply the law, as received from the judge,
to the facts found to exist and that no witness can or should
perform this function for them.
Finally, I express the hope that, despite the language employed in most of the illustrative Virginia cases, Virginia still
has no rigid rule prohibiting opinion testimony regarding an
ultimate fact in issue. For the most part, these cases can be
decided (and perhaps were decided) on other grounds. There
is certainly language in the decisions which justifies this
hope.

